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I. INTRODUCTION 
When, more than 30 years ago, the North Dakota Legislature enacted 
section 47-16-07.1 of the North Dakota Century Code governing residential 
security deposits, the bill’s sponsor, State Senator Howard Freed, expressed 
that “his intent in this legislation was to put some of the security over to the 
lessee.”1  This effort to regulate the security deposit in North Dakota came 
toward the end of a period during which many other states took similar 
steps to establish equivalent protections for both landlord and tenant 
throughout the life of the tenancy and at its end.2  While it can be said that 
the principle of caveat emptor characterized the residential lease throughout 
American history,3 by the early 1970s, courts, legislators, and commenta-
tors recognized the need to even the balance of power between residential 
landlords and their tenants.4 
 
1. See Lease Security Deposits: Hearing on S.B. 2277 Before the Comm. on Judiciary, 1977 
Leg., 45th Sess. (N.D. Jan. 25, 1977) (statement of Sen. Howard Freed) [hereinafter Senate 
Hearing]. 
2. See Lucy Yee, Tenant Protection Through Security Deposit Legislation, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 
136, 136-39 (1979) (reviewing “the wave of pro-tenant law reform” that characterized the late 
1960s and early 1970s). 
3. In American jurisprudence, the principle of caveat emptor, a Latin phrase meaning “let the 
buyer beware,” is first attributed to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Laidlaw v. 
Organ, 15 U.S. 84, 2 Wheat. 178 (1817).  In that case, Organ agreed to buy a large amount of to-
bacco from Laidlaw. Id. at 178.  Before the transaction, Laidlaw asked Organ if he was aware of 
conditions that might cause a rise in the value of tobacco. Id. at 183.  Although he knew that the 
signing of the Treaty of Ghent would result in the end of the War of 1812 and a dramatic rise in 
the price of tobacco, Organ did not provide this information to Laidlaw. Id.  When he later learned 
of the Treaty, Laidlaw refused to deliver the tobacco to Organ on the basis that Organ had 
deceived him. Id. at 179.  After Organ won a lawsuit to compel delivery of the tobacco, Laidlaw 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.  Addressing the issue of non-disclosure, Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall explained that Organ had no obligation to share the information with Laidlaw 
even though Organ knew that Laidlaw was under a misapprehension: 
The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances, which 
might influence the price of the commodity, and which was exclusively within the 
knowledge of the vendee, ought to have been communicated by him to the vendor? 
The court is of opinion that he was not bound to communicate it. It would be difficult 
to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the means of intelli-
gence are equally accessible to both parties.  But at the same time, each party must 
take care not to say or do anything tending to impose upon the other. 
Id. at 194. 
4. Yee, supra note 2, at 136-37. 
        
2009] LANDLORD WEAPON OR TENANT SHIELD 253 
With respect to the security deposit, the historical imbalance of power 
manifested itself in a rather obvious way.  In general, landlords and tenants 
each understood that the tenant’s expense in going to court to seek return of 
the security deposit would almost always exceed the amount of the deposit 
itself.5  As such, tenants often chose not to act on their right to return of the 
deposit rather than involving the courts.6  Appreciating the economic and 
procedural realities at play, many landlords simply retained the security de-
posit as a matter of course.7 
In an effort to shift some of the protection afforded by the security de-
posit from the landlord to the tenant and aiming to pass “good, important 
consumer-protection legislation,” the North Dakota Legislature answered in 
1977 by effectuating “limitations and requirements” for the proper with-
holding of security deposits.8  In particular, the Legislature sought to incen-
tivize landlord compliance with the statute by including provisions allowing 
tenants to recover treble damages for improper withholding.9  Through a 
more just disposition of the security deposit, the Legislature aimed to bring 
the relationship and relative bargaining positions of the landlord and tenant 
closer together.10 
While well-intentioned, North Dakota’s security deposit legislation re-
mains essentially untested by state courts more than three decades after its 
passage.  As a result, even in the face of clear legislative intent and express 
provisions aimed at deterring landlord mishandling of the security deposit, 
the potential for such misconduct—and the unavailability of effective 
means for tenant recourse against it—still remains.11 
 
5. Kathryn Porter Reimer, Comment, Colorado’s Wrongful Withholding of Security Deposits 
Act: Three Litigious Snares in an Untested Law, 49 DENV. L.J. 453, 453 (1973); see also Claude 
M. McQuarrie, III, The Residential Tenant’s Security Deposit—A Protected Interest Worth Liti-
gating, 8 ST. MARY’S L.J. 829, 831 (1976) (“Tenants have been especially vulnerable to excessive 
deductions and withholding of their deposits because of the prohibitive expense of litigation and 
the inconvenience involved. . . .”). 
6. See Jay Victor Jory, The Residential Lease: Some Innovations for Improving the Landlord-
Tenant Relationship, 3 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 31, 38 (1971) (addressing the “erratic nature of se-
curity deposit refunding procedures” and noting that “many tenants often tacitly accept the in-
equitable results”). 
7. Id. at 38-39. 
8. Lease Security Deposits: Hearing on S.B. 2277 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 1977 
Leg., 45th Sess. (N.D. Feb. 23, 1977) (statement of Dale Sandstrom, Consumer Fraud Division, 
Att’y Gen.’s Office) [hereinafter House Hearing]. 
9. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-07.1(3) (1999 & Supp. 2007). 
10. See Porter Reimer, supra note 5, at 453, 459. 
11. See, e.g., Paul T. Rosynsky, Landlord Docked $5.5 Million for Withholding Security 
Deposits, OAK. TRIB., Nov. 7, 2008, at A5 (detailing Alameda, California Superior Court jury ver-
dict in class action lawsuit filed by at least two hundred tenants against owner of apartment 
buildings and single family homes who purposefully withheld more than $180,000 worth of secu-
rity deposits; lawsuit revealed that owner fought tenants’ claims to deposits “by filing lawsuits 
against those who tried to recoup costs in small claims court.  In his suits . . . [the owner] would 
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In an effort to address this lingering problem, this article reviews North 
Dakota’s existing residential security deposit law and proposes amendments 
aimed at carrying out its stated purpose.  Part II explores the historical 
foundations of residential landlord-tenant law in America, detailing the 
disproportionate treatment tenants uniformly received at common law and 
describing the evolution of lease security as a mechanism with the exclusive 
goal of protecting the landlord.  Part III considers the progressive national 
context in which the North Dakota Legislature enacted the state’s security 
deposit statute.  This section places particular focus on the paradigm shift of 
the 1960s and early 1970s, in which courts and legislators throughout the 
United States took steps to protect tenants from overreaching landlords.  
Part IV highlights the pro-tenant motivations that led to the enactment of 
the North Dakota security deposit legislation and reviews the statute’s spe-
cific provisions.  Lastly, part V identifies relevant shortcomings and ambi-
guities in the current security deposit provisions and proposes specific 
amendments to the legislation for consideration by North Dakota 
lawmakers. 
II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RESIDENTIAL LEASE 
SECURITY:  PROTECTING THE LANDLORD 
Until the late 1960s and 1970s, residential landlord-tenant law in the 
United States was skewed heavily in favor of the landlord.12  Commentators 
trace the origins of this imbalance to the pre-medieval and medieval periods 
of Europe, during which serfs, or small farmers, rented land for agricultural 
purposes.13  With land rather than a dwelling serving as the focus of the 
tenancy, the common law treatment of the transaction as a conveyance of 
property governed.  The tenant was considered to be something akin to the 
servant of the landlord and the resulting “tenancy at will” gave the tenant 
 
claim a larger sum of money by moving the case to Superior Court, forcing many tenants to drop 
cases because of costs.”).  The relative number of home rentals in North Dakota makes the threat 
of misconduct in the landlord-tenant setting considerable.  As of 2000, approximately one-third 
(33.4 percent) of all occupied housing units in North Dakota were inhabited by renters, giving 
North Dakota the twelfth highest proportion of renter-occupied units in the United States at that 
time. The Population Bulletin, North Dakota State Data Center at North Dakota State University, 
Vol. 17, No. 7, July 2001, at 1. 
12. See Amanda Quester, Evolution Before Revolution:  Dynamism in Connecticut Landlord-
Tenant Law Prior to the Late 1960s, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 408, 409 (2006) (“Implicit in this fo-
cus upon the late 1960s and 1970s are two ideas about the preceding period: that landlord-tenant 
law prior to the 1960s consistently favored landlords and that the rules governing the relations 
between landlord and tenant changed very little in America from the reception of the English 
common law to the eve of the late-twentieth-century revolution.”). 
13. See ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1.1, at 2 
(1980); Paul G. Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society, 46 J. URB. 
L. 695, 700 (1969). 
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“only rights regarding occupying the land . . . [but] no protection from, and 
no remedy against, wrongful actions of the landlord.”14 
Indeed, although the development of business and commerce in early 
colonial times saw an intertwining of contract principles with the property 
law view of landlord-tenant law,15 most American jurisdictions historically 
honored the baseline rule of caveat emptor—“let the buyer beware”—and 
permitted landlords to act without interference in evicting tenants upon any 
perceived breach, offering poor quality properties, choosing or rejecting 
tenants, and enjoying immunity from tort liability.16  Beyond the obli-
gations to provide quiet title to the tenant and honor a tenant’s implied right 
for quiet enjoyment during the lease period, the landlord had no duty to 
deliver a rental property in any specific condition or otherwise to maintain 
or repair the property at any point.17  In addition to his periodic rent 
obligations, the tenant assumed all risk of loss or deterioration once the 
lease was entered and was responsible for making all repairs necessary to 
prevent waste or deterioration.18 
 
14. See Tom G. Geurts, The Historical Development of the Lease in Residential Real Estate, 
32 REAL EST. L.J. 356, 357 (2004).  See also Garrity, supra note 13, at 700 (“The terms and 
conditions of these early tenancies were recognized and reinforced by the common law of 
conveyancing and were designed and structured for a rural society by landlord-oriented lawyers 
and courts.”). 
15. Although not the focus of this article, much has been written about the dual nature of the 
lease as a “hybrid” creature understandably governed by both property law and contract law.  See, 
e.g., Robert H. Kelley, Any Reports of the Death of the Property Law Paradigm for Leases Have 
Been Greatly Exaggerated, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1563, 1565-68 (1995) (listing the operative prin-
ciples of the property law and contract law paradigms of lease governance); Mary Ann Glendon, 
The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 505-09 (1982); 
Geurts, supra note 14. 
16. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, § 1.1, at 2; Garrity, supra note 13, at 700.  Notably, a 
very small number of states, including North Dakota, legislated limited exceptions to the rule of 
caveat emptor as early as the 1800s.  See Glendon, supra note 15, at 515 (citing Reppy, The Field 
Codification Concept, in David Dudley Field Centenary Essays 17, 48 (A Reppy ed. 1949)).  The 
exception statutes required the lessor of a building intended for human occupation, in the absence 
of an agreement to the contrary, to deliver the building in habitable condition. Id.  Thereafter, the 
lessor was obligated to repair all subsequent dilapidations not caused by the tenant’s negligence.  
If the landlord violated these duties, the tenant was permitted to either leave the premises or to 
apply rent, in the amount of one month’s worth or more, toward the cost of making the repairs.  Id. 
at 515.  Still, although the statutes were intended to curb abuses in the tenancy through a de-
lineation of “the duties and rights of landlords and tenants,” courts appeared to liberally construe 
them in favor of the landlord. See, e.g., Torreson v. Walla, 92 N.W. 834, 836 (N.D. 1902) (holding 
that the absence of a sewer in a home, which caused water to run unabated into the home’s 
basement, did not render the house unfit for human occupancy).  Moreover, all of the duties im-
posed on the landlord under these early statutes “could be, and presumably frequently were, ex-
cluded by contract.” Glendon, supra note 15, at 515. 
17. Glendon, supra note 15, at 510-11. 
18. Id. at 511 n.51 (quoting Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 115 23 N.E. 126, 127 (1889)) 
(“It is uniformly held in this state that the lessee of real property must run the risk of its con-
dition. . . .  As was said by the learned General Term when deciding this case:  ‘The tenant hires at 
his peril and a rule similar to that of caveat emptor applies, and throws on the lessee the 
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Apart from issues surrounding the physical condition of the property 
before and during the tenancy, the law viewed the notion of “security” in 
the landlord-tenant context, referring to those protections necessary to se-
cure against tenant non-performance, almost exclusively from the perspec-
tive of the landlord.19  In instances of tenant failure to pay rent at any point 
during the lease term, the law generally authorized landlords to immediately 
terminate the lease.20  Frustrated landlords were additionally able to make 
use of self-help rights rooted in English common law against the property 
of the tenant even where a written lease agreement was silent regarding 
such rights.21  For example, landlords were generally permitted to forcibly 
enter and remove the tenant without facing the threat of civil liability.22  Al-
ternatively, a landlord seeking to recover rent could exercise his “right of 
distress,” a restricted entitlement to take control of his tenant’s belongings 
located on the leased property,23 or his “right of distraint,” the act of locking 
the tenant out of the premises for the purpose of gaining control over the te-
nant’s property.24  Most jurisdictions permitted these harsh mechanisms de-
spite the seemingly unchecked power they conferred upon landlords.25 
 
responsibility of examining as to the existence of defects in the premises, and of providing against 
their ill effects.’”). 
19. See Note, Methods of Securing Lessor Against Rental Defaults on Long Term Leases, 45 
YALE L.J. 537, 537 (1936) (“To minimize the risks attendant upon long-term leases, landlords 
have resorted to various devices by which the lessee, upon execution of the lease, places the 
landlord in possession of assets sufficient to assure that if the lessee becomes financially unable to 
pay the rent, the lessor will nevertheless be able to have satisfaction for the damages thereby 
incurred.”); Jory, supra note 6, at 38 (“Theoretically, the security deposits are created to insure 
against the contingencies of unpaid rents, tenant-inflicted damages, and unclean premises at the 
termination of the lease.”). 
20. See Glendon, supra note 15, at 512. 
21. See Edward L. Schwartz & Noah H. Atler, Security Deposits and Guaranties Under 
Leases, 1 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 405, 405 (1966) (citing 32 AM. JUR. Landlord and Tenant 
§ 564 (1941); 52 AM. JUR. Landlord and Tenant § 605 (1947); 9 A.L.R. 300 (1920)); see also 
Randy G. Gerchick, No Easy Way Out:  Making the Summary Eviction Process a Fairer and 
More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759, 775 (1994). 
22. See Gerchick, supra note 21, at 776.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 88, General Principle (1965) (identifying the many American jurisdictions that “follow the ear-
lier English rule, which was reinstated by Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club, 1 K.B. 720 (C.A.) 
(1920), and holding that no civil action for assault and battery is available to one who has been 
forcibly ousted by the person entitled to possession if the force used was not unreasonable”). 
23. See Allan W. Rhynhart, Distress, 13 MD. L. REV. 185, 185 (1953). 
24. See Richard E. Blumberg & Brian Quinn Robbins, Beyond URLTA:  A Program for 
Achieving Real Tenant Goals, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 17 (1976); see Tova Indritz, The 
Tenants’ Rights Movement, 1 N.M. L. REV. 1, 48 (1971) (noting the overlap and oft-inter-
changeable use of the terms “right of distress” and “right of distraint” and reviewing the common 
law roots of each right). 
25. See MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 20.1, at 1265, n.1 (4th ed. 1997 & 
Supp. 2002) (citations omitted) (describing the right of distraint as “crude, quick, and drastic” and 
noting that it “allowed a man to be his own avenger, or to administer redress to himself”); see also 
Quester, supra note 12, at 410-11 (quoting ELIZABETH BLACKMAR, MANHATTAN FOR RENT, 
1785-1850, at 222 (1989)) (indicating that New York lawmakers in the early 1800s described 
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In the early part of the twentieth century, the proliferation of the resi-
dential tenancy in the urban setting gave rise to a renewed focus on security 
for landlords: 
With the concentration of urban real estate ownership in a few 
hands, and the increase in tenants consequent upon the growth of 
cities, lease security for landlords has become a matter of consi-
derable importance.  To have a place to live, or conduct their busi-
ness, the great percentage of urban dwellers must obtain the use of 
premises by way of lease.  In anticipation of this demand, large 
sums have been invested in real estate, and in improvements 
thereon; in many instances the land and improvements are mort-
gaged to secure the sums for investment.  Under such circums-
tances the enterprise is bound to be a losing one for the owner if he 
is not in some way assured of the profits from his leases.  Assur-
ance may possibly be had in the personal responsibility of the les-
see, but in many cases it is far from certain that this will be 
adequate.26 
Coinciding with this “urbanization” of the landlord-tenant relationship, 
many state legislatures and courts imposed upon landlords severe restric-
tions or outright bans on self-help evictions.27  In an effort to curb abuses by 
landlords employing the rights of distress and distraint,28 states also acted to 
modify or abolish these rights by passing landlord lien statutes seeking to 
regulate recovery against the goods, chattels, or property of the tenant.29 
 
distraint as “‘one of the most severe’ remedies and speculated that it ‘may be the instrument of 
more oppression than any other proceeding.’”). 
 In Lindsey v. Normet, the United States Supreme Court explained that “[t]he landlord-tenant 
relationship was one of the few areas where the right to self-help was recognized by the common 
law of most States, and the implementation of this right has been fraught with ‘violence and 
quarrels and bloodshed.’”  Lindsey v. Normet , 405 U.S. 56, 71 (1972) (quoting Entelman v. 
Hagood, 22 S.E. 545, 545 (Ga. 1895)). 
26. James R. Wilson, Lease Security Deposits, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 426 (1934) (citations 
omitted). 
27. In many jurisdictions, summary process statutes were enacted to provide for “expeditious 
judicial procedures” for landlords seeking to recover against tenants in default or holding over 
after the end of the lease term.  Glendon, supra note 15, at 512.  While summary process statutes 
afforded some protection to tenants against forcible eviction, they tended to favor landlords by 
providing a simpler and more efficient alternative to ejectment, which generally required the 
landlord to prove he held superior title to the property in dispute and was a relatively slow, fairly 
complex, and substantially expensive procedure. Id. 
28. See Blumberg & Robbins, supra note 24, at 17-18 (reviewing the roots and inequities of 
the common law concepts of distress and distraint). 
29. Wilson, supra note 26, at 427; see Blumberg & Robbins, supra note 24, at 17 (noting that 
even as modified, the landlord lien statutes “nevertheless function[ed] extrajudicially without af-
fording the tenant a prior hearing or court supervision”); see also Edward H. Rabin, The Revolu-
tion in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 
538 (1984) (citing SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, § 6:27) (noting that “of the minority of states that 
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Conscious of the limitations on and inconvenience of recovery under 
the common law and statutory security mechanisms, landlords increasingly 
relied upon the inclusion of explicit security provisions in lease agree-
ments.30  Such provisions created express security through a variety of 
means:  monetary security deposits from tenants, the creation of a mortgage 
or lien on the tenant’s property, the undertaking of a surety or guarantor, or 
the placement of buildings, improvements, or other fixtures on the rental 
premises by the tenant.31  It was commonly understood that the security 
deposit,32 the most popular of these lease agreement security devices, was 
“for the sole benefit of the landlord, and the competitive ability of landlords 
to demand and obtain such deposits directly reflects the tightness of the 
housing market.”33  Consistent with this thinking, the common law placed 
no limitations on the security deposit amount, and neither required the lan-
dlord to pay interest on the deposit nor prohibited the landlord from com-
mingling the deposit funds.34  Other facets of security deposit administra-
tion also caused clear unfairness to the tenant, including the absence of 
checks on “the various rights and duties arising upon assignment of the lan-
dlord’s interest in the deposit, the landlord’s freedom to use the money dep-
osited for his own purposes, . . . and the tenant’s priority in the deposit vis-
a-vis creditors of the landlord upon the landlord’s insolvency.”35 
Of all the potential security deposit concerns facing tenants, none were 
greater than the uncertainty surrounding the ultimate return of the deposit 
 
recognized distraint against residential tenants in 1952, many have abandoned the remedy either 
by statute or judicial decision”). 
30. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, § 6:27, at 450 (noting that the costliness and un-
certainty of litigation and judgment satisfaction, the inconvenience of the common law right of 
distraint and equivalent statutory lien provisions, and other reasons have compelled landlords to 
“resort[] to contractual protection by insisting upon establishment of a fund to answer for tenant 
delinquencies”); see also Schwartz & Atler, supra note 21, at 406-07; Wilson, supra note 26, at 
427; Rabin, supra note 29, at 539. 
31. See Wilson, supra note 26, at 427; see also Note, Methods of Securing Lessor Against 
Rental Defaults on Long Term Leases, 45 YALE L.J. 537, 537-38 (1936). 
32. Blumberg & Robbins, supra note 24, at 18 n.92 (citing 2 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 
§ 231(2) (P. Rohan ed. 1974)).  “A security deposit is a device to assure the lessor the full benefit 
of his original agreement by requiring the tenant to pay an amount to the landlord to be held as 
security against the tenant’s failure of payment or other breach of covenant in the lease.” Id. 
33. Note, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: Facilitation of or Impediment 
to Reform Favorable to the Tenant?, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845, 875 (1973-74) [hereinafter 
Note, Landlord and Tenant Act]. 
34. See generally SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, §§ 6:27-6:38, at 450-87 (analyzing the 
“ambiguities and inequities that pervade the common law administration of tenant deposits”); Ra-
bin, supra note 29, at 539. 
35. Note, Landlord and Tenant Act, supra note 33, at 875; see also McQuarrie, supra note 5, 
at 831 (noting that “[l]andlord abuse usually takes three forms: (1) requiring an excessively large 
amount as a deposit, (2) making excessive deductions from deposits for unspecified or vaguely 
defined damages, and (3) failing to return the deposit upon termination”). 
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monies by the landlord at lease end.36  On this point, the law was generally 
clear that, where the controlling lease agreement called for the tenant to 
make a security deposit to the landlord at the inception of the tenancy to 
ensure the lessee’s performance,37 the tenant was entitled to a return of the 
deposit amount less any loss or damage the landlord sustained.38  Still, land-
lords could and did take comfort in knowing that the realities of the legal 
system would make such recovery extremely difficult, if not impossible: 
[T]he security deposit in actuality has evolved into a bonus to be 
kept by the landlord upon termination of the lease agreement reg-
ardless of the damages actually sustained by the landlord.  Land-
lords will retain security deposits after the departure of a tenant 
secure in the knowledge that a former tenant is severely inhibited 
from initiating legal action.  This restraint is a product of a com-
bination of factors including problems of proof, the relatively 
small sum of money at issue, the time factor, and the distance now 
separating the tenant from his former landlord.  Where the reim-
bursement is forthcoming, usually the payments are delayed, the 
application of the retained amounts unitemized, and the interim 
retention and use of the funds having been without cost to the 
landlord.39 
So through the 1960s the majority of residential tenants in America, faced 
with specific concerns about security deposits and the more general ob-
 
36. See James F. Conley, An Overview of the Tennessee Residential Landlord and Tenant 
Act, 7 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 116 (1976-77) (“Perhaps no area of contention between landlord 
and tenant is of greater concern or occurrence than that of the return of deposits at the termination 
of the lease.  Such concern may be due to frequent complaints of landlords’ unjustifiable retention 
of all or part of the deposit and the lack of an effective tenant remedy.”). 
37. While not considered in detail here, courts viewed “monies paid upon the execution of a 
lease . . . [as] fall[ing] into four classes:  (1) advance payment of rent; (2) as a bonus or 
consideration for the execution of the lease; (3) as liquidated damages; and (4) as a deposit to 
secure faithful performance of the terms of the lease. Thompson v. Swiryn, 213 P.2d 740, 744 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (emphasis added); see also SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, § 6:27, at 450-
51.  Although courts were apt to honor the classification given to the prepayment if the intent of 
the parties could clearly be evinced by the lease language, “[e]merging from the cases [was] a 
constructional preference for a security deposit since this classification accommodates the 
landlord’s desire for protection and the normal expectation of the tenant for return of all or part of 
the fund at the end of the tenancy.” SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, § 6:27, at 451-52 (citations 
omitted).  Where a valid liquidated damages clause was found, it was commonly held that the 
landlord could retain the entire prepayment amount upon tenant non-performance despite the 
actual damages suffered.  Id. at 451. 
38. Schwartz & Atler, supra note 21, at 418. 
39. Jory, supra note 6, at 38-39; see also Blumberg & Robbins, supra note 24, at 18-19 & 
n.93 (citing 2 National Housing and Economic Development Law Project, Handbook on Housing 
Law, ch. 3, at 70 (1970)) (“While security deposits may serve legitimate landlord interests, they 
are also readily abused. . . .  The withholding of security deposits after termination of the lease 
may be a fruitful strategy due to the inconvenience of bringing an action in small claims court.”). 
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stacles emanating from the one-sidedness inherent in the residential lease-
hold setting, were hamstrung in their abilities to find clean and safe 
housing.40 
III. SHIFTING THE FOCUS TO TENANT PROTECTION:  A 
BACKDROP TO NORTH DAKOTA’S RESIDENTIAL SECURITY 
DEPOSIT LAW 
Sparked by ever-increasing rates of residential tenancies throughout the 
United States41 and the rise in the general political consciousness that 
characterized the 1960s, commentators like Boston College Law School 
Professor Paul Garrity began to speak out on the need for legislatures and 
the judiciary to address the accepted dormancy of landlord-tenant law and 
the resulting harmful impact on the residential tenant: 
In contrast with concern for and protection of consumers of other 
necessities of life, legislatures have reinforced the legal status of 
suppliers of rental housing and have under-regulated their respon-
sibilities.  Moreover, by refusing to overturn or condemn illogical 
precedents or unreasonable practices, courts have further en-
trenched landlords’ prerogative and have impeded needed im-
provements to much urban low-income housing.  There has been a 
conspicuous reluctance to revise legal theory to respond to the ex-
igencies of the contemporary housing crisis.42 
Simultaneously, urban tenants from the poor, middle, and upper classes 
banded together to form groups advocating for tenants’ rights and to org-
anize rent and condition strikes decrying poor living conditions.43  Upon 
 
40. See Charles Donahue, Jr., Change in the American Law of Landlord and Tenant Law, 37 
MOD. L. REV. 242, 245-46 (1974) (“All this has brought us approximately to 1965.  American had 
an antique if not an antiquated landlord-tenant law, legislatures which were incapable of or 
uninterested in doing anything about it, a system of housing which put the renting classes almost 
exclusively on the private market, and a procedural system heavily skewed in favour of 
landlords.”); Indritz, supra note 24, at 7 (“Thus it is that tenants continue to pay high rent and 
endure wet basements, leaky plumbing, exposed wires, unvented gas fixtures, doors that won’t 
lock, sagging stairs and porches, days without heat or hot water, unlit corridors, rats and rat bites, 
illegally converted apartments without proper light and air, weeks without garbage collection, and 
combination kitchen-toilets.  And all the while the landlord can say, ‘If you don’t like it, move 
out,’ knowing he can rent the apartment to someone else.”). 
41. Toward the end of the 1960s, it was estimated that 40% of all housing in the United 
States was occupied by tenants, and that well over 70% of residents rented in bigger cities, such as 
New York City and Chicago. Indritz, supra note 24, at 5 (noting that seventy million Americans 
and a majority of urban residents were tenants). 
42. Garrity, supra note 13, at 697-98. 
43. See Donahue, supra note 40, at 246 (noting that with the “new mood of radical 
consumerism . . . [t]he resident of a Park Avenue flat who could not get his landlord to fix the 
garbage disposal unit began to perceive himself as having a problem different in quality but not in 
kind from that of the black resident of Harlem whose flat was infested with rats”).  See generally 
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this foundation of “activism that demanded prompt, dramatic changes,” the 
relatively short period of time from approximately 1968 to 1978 saw a 
“revolutionary” surge of pro-tenant law reform that would forevermore 
change the face of the landlord-tenant relationship.44 
Before the 1960s, only a small minority of states had acted to protect 
tenants against landlord abuses.45  Toward the end of that decade, however, 
courts and legislatures began to act, almost in concert, to effectuate changes 
aimed at breaking away from the pro-landlord tenets of the common law.46  
In a number of jurisdictions, courts were first to dismiss the accepted notion 
of caveat emptor to find an implied warranty or covenant of habitability in 
lease agreements.47  Decisional law also moved further away from common 
law precedent by significantly expanding landlord liability for torts that 
occurred on their properties48 and substantially limiting the ability of 
landlords to use eviction as a means of retaliation against their tenants.49 
 
Indritz, supra note 24, at 4-41 (discussing the mobilization efforts of the tenants’ rights movement 
in the late 1960s and 1970s). 
44. See Rabin, supra note 29, at 520-21, 546-47 (describing “the revolution” and exploring 
the relationship between the civil rights movement and the contemporaneous reform of landlord-
tenant law). 
45. See supra note 16.  See also, e.g., Delameter v. Foreman, 239 N.W. 148, 149 (Minn. 
1931) (finding that the landlord of an apartment building infested with vermin had violated an 
“implied covenant that the premises will be habitable”); Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 413 
(Wis. 1961) (finding an implied warranty of habitability in leases on the justification that “[t]he 
need and social desirability of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid population in-
creases, is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliché, caveat emptor”). 
46. See Glendon, supra note 15, at 521-28 (discussing the interaction between courts and 
legislatures in forging the “demise” of traditional landlord-tenant law in residential tenancies). 
47. See, e.g., Javins v. First National Realty, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lemle v. Bree-
dan, 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969).  Javins and Lemle are most commonly cited as the lead cases in 
recognizing the anachronism of applying feudal property law in the modern urban context and 
replacing the traditional land conveyance view of residential tenancy with the contractual doctrine 
of an implied warranty of habitability.  Explaining its holding, the Javins Court stated: 
In our judgment the common law itself must recognize the landlord’s obligation to 
keep his premises in a habitable condition.  This conclusion is compelled by three sep-
arate considerations.  First, we believe that the old rule was based on certain factual 
assumptions which are no longer true; on its own terms, it can no longer be justified.  
Second, we believe that the consumer protection cases . . . require that the old rule be 
abandoned in order to bring residential landlord-tenant law into harmony with the 
principles on which those cases rest.  Third, we think that the nature of today’s urban 
housing market also dictates abandonment of the old rule. 
Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077.  
48. See, e.g., Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (N.H. 1973) (“[W]e today discard the rule 
of ‘caveat lessee’ and the doctrine of landlord nonliability in tort to which it gave birth. . . .  
Henceforth, landlords as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an 
unreasonable risk of harm. . . .  A landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the 
circumstances.”).  See generally SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, at Ch. 4 (reviewing landlord 
liability in tort). 
49. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699-701 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that a 
landlord could not terminate a lease in retaliation for a tenant’s actions in reporting alleged code 
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While it might be said that judicial activism kick-started the overhaul 
of landlord-tenant law, legislation in the overwhelming majority of juris-
dictions would “become the principal mode of regulation in the field” dur-
ing the 1970s.50  Coinciding with the changes brought on by decisional law, 
some forty states enacted legislation by 1980 delineating in more particular 
terms the rights and remedies available to tenants when the landlord failed 
to provide a dwelling meeting minimum standards of habitability.51  Many 
states based this new legislation upon the Uniform Residential Landlord 
and Tenant Act (URLTA), which the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws approved in 1972: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, modernize, and revise the law governing 
the rental of dwelling units and the rights and obligations of lan-
dlords and tenants; (2) to encourage landlords and tenants to 
maintain and improve the quality of housing; and (3) to make uni-
form the law with respect to the subject of this Act among those 
states which enact it.52 
In addition to regulating the conditions of the property during the lease 
term, several states acted between 1967 and 1971 to craft specific laws 
regulating the behavior with respect to the tenant security deposit.53  Fol-
lowing the issuance of the URLTA in 1972, a number of additional states 
adopting its suggested provisions in whole or in part legislated provisions 
specific to the handling of security deposits.54  In 1979, Professor Lucy Yee 
 
violations to housing authorities). See generally SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, at Ch. 12 
(reviewing the court decisions protecting tenants from retaliatory eviction). 
50. Glendon, supra note 15, at 528. 
51. See Glendon, supra note 15, at 523-24 (specifying those states that had enacted 
comprehensive landlord-tenant statutes based on the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant 
Act and those states in which less comprehensive legislation still had the impact codifying an im-
plied warranty of habitability, statutory remedies for housing code violations, or both).  See infra 
note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the URLTA). 
52. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT, 7B U.L.A. 292 (2006) § 1.102(b) 
[hereinafter URLTA].  Following the issuance of the URLTA and over the period of years 
thereafter, numerous articles were written evaluating the URLTA and the state-specific legislation 
that adopted its provisions in whole or in part. See generally e.g., Brian J. Strum, et al., The Uni-
form Residential Landlord and Tenant Act:  Some Suggestions for Improvement, 9 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 402 (1974); J. Conley, supra note 36. 
53. See Yee, supra note 2, at 137-38; see also URLTA § 2.101 (Comment) (identifying 
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New 
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania as states that passed “[w]idely varying legislation . . . af-
fecting security deposits” between 1967 and 1971). 
54. See Yee, supra note 2, at 137 n.5 (identifying Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, and Virginia as states that enacted the 
URLTA).  The URLTA § 2.101 sets forth the following “obligations” of the landlord relating to 
the security deposit: 
(a) A landlord may not demand or receive security, however denominated, in an 
amount or value in excess of [1] month[s] periodic rent. 
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noted in “Tenant Protection Through Security Deposit Legislation,” that 
typical security deposit legislation included variations on the following 
seven elements:  (1) payment of a limited monetary amount from tenant to 
landlord at lease commencement to assure the tenant’s performance of 
obligations under the lease agreement; (2) restrictions on commingling of 
the security deposit money, including provisions governing the kind of 
account in which the deposit needed to be kept by the landlord; (3) 
imposition of a time limit following lease end, usually thirty or sixty days, 
within which the landlord was required to return the entire security deposit 
to the tenant or, in the instance of damage caused by the tenant, provide the 
tenant with an itemization of all amounts withheld to allow for repairs and 
the balance of the deposit, if any; (4) the right of the tenant to file a lawsuit, 
upon written notice to do so, if he wished to challenge the landlord’s right 
to retain all or some of the security deposit; (5) a provision permitting the 
tenant to recover two or three times the amount of the security deposit if 
wrongfully withheld; (6) the ability for the tenant to recover attorney’s fees 
if the security deposit was wrongfully withheld; and (7) language prohi-
biting counterclaims by any landlord who failed to comply with the security 
deposit statute in question.55 
Although the transcendent changes to landlord-tenant law that com-
menced in the 1960s differed in detail and scope from jurisdiction to juris-
diction, those states effectuating such changes clearly and uniformly aimed 
to move away from the one-sidedness in the tenancy context that had al-
ways favored the landlord.56 
 
(b) Upon termination of the tenancy property or money held by the landlord as se-
curity may be applied to the payment of accrued rent and the amount of damages 
which the landlord has suffered by reason of the tenant’s noncompliance with Section 
3.101 all as itemized by the landlord in a written notice delivered to the tenant together 
with the amount due [14] days after termination of the tenancy and delivery of posses-
sion and demand by the tenant. 
(c) If the landlord fails to comply with subsection (b) or if he fails to return any pre-
paid rent required to be paid to the tenants under this Act the tenant may recover the 
property and money due him together with damages in an amount equal to [twice] the 
amount wrongfully withheld and reasonable attorney’s fees. 
(d) This section does not preclude the landlord or tenant from recovering other dam-
ages to which he may be entitled under this Act. 
(e) The holder of the landlord’s interest in the premises at the time of the termination 
of the tenancy is bound by this section. 
Id. § 2.101. 
55. See Yee, supra note 2, at 139-41 (citing specific provisions of the security deposit acts 
then in effect in Colorado, Texas, and New Jersey). 
56. See Rabin, supra note 29, at 519 (“The residential tenant, long the stepchild of the law, 
has now become its ward and darling.  Tenants’ rights have increased dramatically; landlords’ 
rights have decreased dramatically.”). 
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IV. THE NORTH DAKOTA RESIDENTIAL SECURITY DEPOSIT 
ACT:  ITS INTENDED PROTECTIONS AND EVOLUTION 
Within this “trend toward greater protection of the residential tenant,” 
the North Dakota Legislature acted in 1977 to bolster the plight of 
residential tenants living within its borders by passing its own security 
deposit statute.57 
A. THE UNDERLYING INTENT AND LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE 
On April 20, 1977, the North Dakota Legislature passed the state’s first 
security deposit legislation by adding section 47-16-07.1 to the North Da-
kota Century Code.58  Upon passage, the declared purpose of the statute 
was: 
to create and enact a new section . . . relating to lease security de-
posits on real property and dwellings; the return of such deposits 
with interest upon termination of a lease, deposit amounts which 
may be withheld by a lessor and conditions under which amounts 
may be withheld; recovery by a lessee for wrongful withholding of 
security deposits; providing for transfer of security deposits upon a 
change of ownership; and binding the lessor holding the lease at 
the time of termination to return the security deposit.59 
Although the actual language of the statute shows no clear preference 
toward either landlord or tenant, the intent of the North Dakota Legislature 
in passing the 1977 security deposit law is apparent from the discussions of 
the Senate and House Judiciary Committees in the months preceding its 
adoption.60  During the Senate Judiciary Committee’s discussion on January 
25, 1977, Senator Howard Freed, the sponsor of the legislation, articulated 
that “his intent in this legislation was to put some of the security over to the 
lessee.”61  In the same discussion, Dale Sandstrom, then with the consumer 
fraud division of the North Dakota Attorney General’s Office,62 argued 
against the inclusion of certain proposed amendments by noting that “the 
bill, as it is written, is a strong tenant’s bill, and if we put in all of the sug-
gested amendments, it will be a strong landlord’s bill.”63  During the House 
 
57. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, § 1:1, at 5; 1977 N.D. Laws 927. 
58. 1977 N.D. Laws 927. 
59. Id. (citing the legislation’s title). 
60. See Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. Howard Freed); House Hearing, 
supra note 8 (statement of Dale Sandstrom, Consumer Fraud Division, Att’y Gen.’s Office). 
61. Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. Howard Freed). 
62. Justice Sandstrom was elected a Justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court in 1992 and 
still sits today as a member of that Court. 
63. House Hearing, supra note 8. 
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Judiciary Committee’s deliberation about the proposed statute, on February 
23, 1977, Sandstrom explained that “[t]he law now seems to protect the 
landlord the most.  Some of them don’t give back the deposit for various 
reasons and that’s where the trouble comes in. . . .  This type of legislation 
is needed to protect the consumers.”64 
Toward this end of consumer protection, the North Dakota security de-
posit statute enacted in 1977 contained several noteworthy provisions.  The 
first paragraph capped the security deposit amount at not more than one 
month’s rent.65  That paragraph also addressed the handling of the security 
deposit monies during the lease term, requiring that the landlord place the 
monies in an interest-bearing savings account and pay interest accruing on 
the deposit to the tenant upon lease termination.66 
In the second paragraph, the statute specified that the landlord “may 
apply security deposit money and accrued interest upon termination of a 
lease towards any damages the lessor has suffered by reason of deterior-
ations or injuries to the real property or dwelling through the negligence of 
the lessee or his guest.”67  In instances where the security deposit was ap-
plied to cover damages, the landlord was obligated to “itemize[]” the 
“[a]pplication” and deliver or mail “[s]uch itemization . . . to the lessee at 
the last addressed furnished lessor, along with a written notice within thirty 
days after termination of the lease and delivery of possession by the les-
see.”68  In the notice, the landlord would be required to include a statement 
of monies still due to the lessor or the refund due to the lessee.69 
The third paragraph deemed the lessor “liable for treble damages for 
any security deposit money withheld without reasonable justification.”70  
The fourth paragraph addressed the status of the security deposit upon a 
transfer in the ownership of the leased property during the lease term, speci-
fying that the deposit and any interest accrued were to be transferred to the 
“grantee of the lessor’s interest” and that the grantee would, upon actual 
transfer of the deposit and interest, be bound by all provisions of the North 
Dakota security deposit statute.71 
 
64. Id.  Sandstrom added that the North Dakota Attorney General’s Offices and other con-
sumer offices throughout the state were receiving ten to fifteen security deposit related complaints 
each month from tenants. Id.  He opined “that this bill, as written, is good as a potential for putting 
one of the most specific types of legislation into law for consumer protection.”  Id. 
65. 1977 N.D. Laws 927. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 927-28. 
69. Id. at 928. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
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The statute was also notable for its exclusions.72  Unlike the security 
deposit legislation prescribed by the URLTA and contemporaneously 
adopted in some other jurisdictions, the North Dakota security deposit 
statute did not explicitly provide for the recovery of costs and attorney’s 
fees by the tenant73 or place limitations on counterclaims or independent 
actions by the landlord in the event of landlord noncompliance.74  Further, 
the North Dakota statute included no language forbidding a tenant to waive 
the statute’s protections75 or a landlord’s inclusion of prohibited provisions 
in a lease agreement.76  With respect to the return of the security deposit or, 
alternatively, the provision of written notice of an itemized damages 
statement to the tenant, the statute gave the landlord thirty days after the 
termination of the tenancy and delivery of possession rather than the more 
limited fourteen-day period suggested by the URLTA.77 
B. THE EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY 
CODE § 47-16-07.1 
Before the enactment of section 47-16-07.1, no statute and not a single 
reported court decision addressed the administration of security deposits in 
North Dakota.  The common law void on the subject likely extended from 
the reality that attorneys had little incentive, in terms of time or money, to 
litigate security deposit disputes on behalf of tenants where the law did not 
allow for the recovery of monetary penalties or attorney’s fees against the 
landlord in instances of misconduct.78  Following the passage of the North 
Dakota security deposit statute in 1977, one might have reasonably anti-
cipated an increase in illustrative appellate decisions resulting from an 
expected upsurge in security deposit litigation focused on the statute’s 
 
72. See discussion infra Part V (discussing the specific omissions and other deficiencies, as 
well as proposed remedies). 
73. See URLTA § 2.101, 7B U.L.A. 316 (2006); N.J. REV. STAT. § 46:8-21.1 (2003 & Supp. 
2009). 
74. See URLTA § 2.101, 7B U.L.A. 316; COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-103(2) (2008). 
75. See URLTA § 1.403(a)(1), 7B U.L.A. 313; SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, §6:43, at 497. 
76. See URLTA § 1.403(b), 7B U.L.A. 33; SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, §6:43, at 497. 
77. See URLTA § 2.101(b), 7B U.L.A. 316.  The discussions of the North Dakota Senate 
before the passage of the security deposit statute reveal a debate over whether 14 days was 
sufficient time for the landlord to return the deposit or provide the required statement of itemized 
damages and any balance of the deposit to the tenant.  See Senate Hearing, supra note 1.  While 
Assistant Attorney General Sandstrom believed that 14 days was “more than adequate time” for 
the landlord, Wally Owen and John Kavaney, both of the North Dakota Association of Realtors, 
and Lyle Kirmis, of the North Dakota Home Builders Association, all disagreed.  Id.  Despite the 
presence of support for the shorter, more tenant-protective period, the final legislation required 
landlords to return the deposit or itemization within 30 days.  1977 N.D. Laws 927-28. 
78. See Peggy L. England, Tenants’ Rights Under the Missouri Security Deposit Statute, 28 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1035, 1036 (1984) (addressing the unsettled state of the law regarding security 
deposits in Missouri before the enactment of that state’s legislation in 1983). 
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specific provisions.  In fact, only one appellate case since 1977, Mitchell v. 
Preusse,79 speaks to the substantive provisions of the security deposit 
statute.  The Legislature’s two-fold failure to arm the statute with real deter-
rents to landlord abuse and concomitant incentives for tenants to seek 
recourse against abusive landlords is responsible for this lack of interpretive 
jurisprudence. 
In Mitchell v. Preusse, the single appellate case considering the statute, 
the tenants signed a three-month lease in July 1983, paying $300 for the 
first month’s rent and a $300 security deposit to rent a Fargo apartment 
from landlord Preusse.80  Before the lease signing, Preusse promised to 
make specific improvements, including the installation of new doors, the 
purchase of a refrigerator, window repair, and cleaning the apartment, be-
fore lease commencement on September 1, 1983.81  When the tenants ar-
rived in Fargo on September 2, 1984, Preusse had not made the promised 
improvements to the apartment.82  Upon Preusse’s commitment to complete 
the improvements by September 7, plaintiffs left some furniture and boxes, 
but did not begin to reside in the apartment.83  When, on September 7, the 
tenants found the leased apartment still unrepaired, they moved into a mo-
tel.84  The next day, the tenants found another apartment, terminated the 
lease with Preusse, and requested return of their rent and security deposit.85  
Preusse consented to the cancellation of the lease, but failed to return the 
rental payment or security deposit.86 
The tenant-plaintiffs sued their landlord in small claims court alleging 
breach of the apartment rental contract.87  Upon removal of the case to the 
district court for a bench trial, the trial court found that Preusse had 
breached the rental contract by failing to have the apartment ready for oc-
cupancy and awarded plaintiffs $300 for rent paid and treble damages of 
$900 for Preusse’s withholding of the security deposit without reasonable 
justification.88  On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court explained that, 
pursuant to North Dakota Century Code section 47-16-07.1(3), “[t]he de-
termination if the security deposit is withheld unreasonably is a question of 
 
79. 358 N.W.2d 511 (N.D. 1984). 
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fact and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.”89  Because 
Preusse “offered no argument or authority to support his position or to con-
vince [the court it] should second-guess the trial court’s conclusion that he 
unreasonably withheld the security deposit,” the Court affirmed the judg-
ment against him.90  Notably, the Court deemed “meritless” Preusse’s 
contentions that North Dakota Century Code section 47-16-07.1(3) was un-
constitutionally vague.91 
Although the security deposit statute has not been subject to judicial 
interpretation beyond the holding of Mitchell v. Preusse, the Legislature has 
amended it eight times since its original enactment.  In 1979, the Legis-
lature amended the statute to require that the landlord store the security 
deposit in a federally insured deposit account.92  In 1983, the Legislature 
added language to allow the landlord to use the security deposit to cover 
any unpaid rent or “[t]he costs of cleaning or other repairs which were the 
responsibility of the lessee, and which are necessary to return the dwelling 
unit to its original state when the lessee took possession.”93  The only con-
cession to the tenant in this amendment was the addition of language that 
prohibited landlords from using the security deposit to cover the ambiguous 
category of “reasonable wear and tear.”94  In 1985, the Legislature amended 
North Dakota Century Code section 47-16-30.1, relating to abandoned 
property left on a leasehold, to permit landlords to recover from the tenant’s 
security deposit any storage and moving expenses in excess of the proceeds 
from the sale incurred in disposing of such property.95  In 1989, a house-
keeping bill amended the security deposit statute to clarify that the landlord 
was required to itemize any withholding of the deposit, regardless of 
whether such withholding was for damages the landlord has covered, 
unpaid rent, or cost of cleaning or other repairs.96  In 2003, the Legislature 
amended the statute to require the landlord to hold the security deposit in a 
savings account or checking account established for the benefit of the 
tenant.97  In 1995 and 2007, the Legislature used amendments to raise the 
maximum security deposit amount, first to a $1500 ceiling and next to a 
 
89. Id. at 514. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. 1979 N.D. Laws 1233. 
93. 1983 N.D. Laws 1534. 
94. Id.  
95. 1985 N.D. Laws 1815.  
96. 1989 N.D. Laws 1449.  Before this amendment, an oversight in the statute required 
itemization only when withholding for damages. 
97. 2003 N.D. Laws 1361. 
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$2500 ceiling, when the tenant has a pet.98  Most recently, in 2009, the 
statute was updated to clarify that any portions of the security deposit not 
claimed by the tenant within a year of termination of the lease agreement 
needs to be reported by the Landlord pursuant to North Dakota’s Uniform 
Unclaimed Property Act.99 
 
98. 1995 N.D. Laws 1278; 2007 N.D. Laws 1465. 
99. 2009 N.D. Laws 1156.  Today, the exact language of the North Dakota security deposit 
statute is as follows: 
1. The lessor of real property or a dwelling who requires money as a security de-
posit, however denominated, shall deposit the money in a federally insured 
interest-bearing savings or checking account for the benefit of the tenant.  The se-
curity deposit and any interest accruing on the deposit must be paid to the lessee 
upon termination of a lease, subject to the conditions of subsection 2.  A lessor 
may not demand or receive security, however denominated, in an amount or value 
in excess of one month’s rent, except if the lessee is housing a pet on the leased 
premises, the security may not exceed the greater of two thousand five hundred 
dollars or an amount equivalent to two months’ rent. 
2. A lessor may apply security deposit money and accrued interest upon termination 
of a lease towards: 
a. Any damages the lessor has suffered by reason of deteriorations or injuries 
to the real property or dwelling through the negligence of the lessee or the 
lessee’s guest. 
b. Any unpaid rent. 
c. The costs of cleaning or other repairs which were the responsibility of the 
lessee, and which are necessary to return the dwelling unit to its original 
state when the lessee took possession, reasonable wear and tear excepted. 
 Application of any portion of a security deposit not paid to the lessee upon 
termination of the lease must be itemized by the lessor.  Such itemization 
together with the amount due must be delivered or mailed to the lessee at the 
last address furnished lessor, along with a written notice within thirty days 
after termination of the lease and delivery of possession by the lessee.  The 
notice must contain a statement of any amount still due the lessor or the re-
fund due the lessee.  A lessor is not required to pay interest on security de-
posits if the period of occupancy was less than nine months in duration.  
Any amounts not claimed from the lessor by the lessee within one year of 
the termination of the lease agreement are subject to the reporting require-
ments of section 47-30.1-08. 
3. A lessor is liable for treble damages for any security deposit money withheld 
without reasonable justification. 
4. Upon a transfer in ownership of the leased real property or dwelling, the security 
deposit and accrued interest shall be transferred to the grantee of the lessor’s in-
terest.  The grantor shall not be relieved of liability under this section until trans-
fer of the security deposit to the grantee.  The holder of the lessor’s interest in the 
real property or dwelling at the termination of a lease shall be bound by this sec-
tion even though such holder was not the original lessor who received the security 
deposit. 
5. This section applies to the state and to political subdivisions of the state that lease 
real property or dwellings and require money as a security deposit. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-07.1 (1999 & Supp. 2009). 
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V. FIXING THE NORTH DAKOTA RESIDENTIAL SECURITY 
DEPOSIT STATUTE 
As a means of neutralizing the disparity in bargaining power that his-
torically characterized the landlord-tenant relationship in North Dakota and 
elsewhere, the Legislature contended in 1977 that its security deposit legis-
lation would be an important step toward affording the North Dakota tenant 
consumer-type protections that had already been given effect in other juris-
dictions and in transactions outside of the leasehold setting.  Specifically, 
the Legislature attempted to detail a procedure for handling security de-
posits that would be clear to and protective of both landlord and tenant, and 
provide adequate remedies for tenants victimized by landlords who do not 
comply with the statutory procedures.  If enhanced protection of the te-
nant’s security was the Legislature’s intent, however, a number of deficien-
cies and exclusions in the current security deposit statute stand in the way 
of that primary aspiration being realized.  The Legislature can correct these 
shortcomings by amending the security deposit procedures in section 47-16-
07.1 in the fashion detailed below.  The proposed amended statute that fol-
lows this article incorporates the prescribed changes, most of which are 
based upon existing security deposit law in other jurisdictions.100 
A. CLARIFY PERMISSIBLE WITHHOLDINGS AND MANDATE 
PRE-TENANCY INSPECTION 
Presently, subsection 47-16-07.1(2) permits a landlord, upon lease ter-
mination, to apply the security deposit and interest toward: 
a. Any damages the lessor has suffered by reason of deteriorations 
or injuries to the real property or dwelling through the negli-
gence of the lessee or the lessee’s guest. 
b. Any unpaid rent. 
c. The costs of cleaning or other repairs which were the 
responsibility of the lessee, and which are necessary to return 
the dwelling unit to its original state when the lessee took 
possession, reasonable wear and tear excepted.101 
Because of its ambiguous wording, subsection (2)(a) now gives North Da-
kota landlords leeway to unilaterally determine what “damages” have been 
suffered because of “deteriorations or injuries” to the leased property and to 
 
100. See John P. Ludington, Annotation, Landlord-Tenant Security Deposit Legislation, 63 
A.L.R. 4th 901 (1988) (surveying security deposit legislation across the United States and the case 
law interpreting it). 
101. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-07.1(2) (2007). 
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make corresponding deductions from the security deposit by simply claim-
ing that such “deteriorations or injuries” were caused by the “negligence” of 
the tenant.102  Further, although another statutory provision within section 
47-16-13.2 defines the “cleaning” and “other repair” responsibilities of the 
tenant during the lease term,103 subsection (2)(c) presents confusion regard-
ing what amounts to “reasonable wear and tear” and the manner in which 
landlords must determine the “original state [of the property] when the 
[tenant] took possession.”104 
While disputes over the kinds and causes of damages to the leased 
property must be determined on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis, three 
additions reflected in the proposed amended version of the statute would 
better protect both landlord and tenant by giving more definition and struc-
ture to the damage assessment process presently contemplated by sub-
section 47-16-07.1(2).  First, the term “reasonable wear and tear” should be 
more precisely defined as follows: 
As used in this section, “reasonable wear and tear” includes any 
deterioration to the real property or dwelling 
(i) based upon the use for which the rental unit is intended, with-
out negligence, carelessness, accident, or abuse of the premises 
or equipment or chattels by the lessee or members of his 
household, or their invitees or guests; or 
 
102. See Id. 
103. Id. § 47-16-13.2 (2007 & Supp. 2008).  This section sets forth the obligations of the te-
nant in maintaining a rental unit, articulates what a tenant must specifically do with respect to 
keeping the leased property “clean”: 
A tenant of a residential dwelling unit shall: 
1. Comply with all obligations primarily imposed upon tenants by applicable provi-
sions of building and housing codes materially affecting health and safety. 
2. Keep that part of the premises that the tenant occupies and uses as clean and safe as 
the condition of the premises permit. 
3. Periodically remove all ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste from the tenant’s 
dwelling unit, and dispose of them in a clean and safe manner. 
4. Keep all plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit or used by the tenant as clean as 
their condition permits. 
5. Use in a reasonable manner all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, 
air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances including elevators in the 
premises. 
6. Not deliberately or negligently destroy, deface, damage, impair, or remove any part 
of the premises or knowingly permit any person to do so. 
7. Conduct oneself and require other persons on the premises with the tenant’s consent 
to conduct themselves in a manner that will not disturb the tenant’s neighbors’ peace-
ful enjoyment of the premises. 
Id. 
104. See England, supra note 78, at 1047 (focusing on similar ambiguities in Missouri’s se-
curity deposit legislation). 
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(ii) caused by the lessor’s failure to prepare for expected condi-
tions or by the lessor’s failure to comply with an obligation of 
the lessor imposed by this chapter.105 
This more detailed definition makes explicit that the security deposit 
monies cannot be used to pay for normal depreciation of the property and 
fixtures,106 or for any repairs caused by the landlord’s failure to maintain 
the leased property in the manner required by section 47-16-13.1 of the 
North Dakota Century Code.107 
Second, to reinforce that landlords may not deduct for any “reasonable 
wear and tear” or conditions that preexisted the tenancy, that exception 
 
105. Proposed Amended Statute, attached following article, § 47-16-07.1(5)(c) [hereinafter 
Proposed Amended Statute]. 
106. Maine’s statutory definition of “normal wear and tear” in the lease setting provides: 
“Normal wear and tear” means the deterioration that occurs, based upon the use for 
which the rental unit is intended, without negligence, carelessness, accident or abuse 
of the premises or equipment or chattels by the tenant or members of the tenant’s 
household or their invitees or guests.  The term “normal wear and tear” does not in-
clude sums or labor expended by the landlord in removing from the rental unit articles 
abandoned by the tenant such as trash.  If a rental unit was leased to the tenant in a ha-
bitable condition or if it was put in a habitable condition by the landlord during the 
term of the tenancy, normal wear and tear does not include sums required to be ex-
pended by the landlord to return the rental unit to a habitable condition, which may in-
clude costs for cleaning, unless expenditure of these sums was necessitated by actions 
of the landlord, events beyond the control of the tenant or actions of someone other 
than the tenant or members of the tenant’s household or their invitees or guests. 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6031 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-
12-102 (2008) (defining “normal wear and tear”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-321 (Michie 2008) (de-
fining “normal wear and tear”); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.070(b) (2008) (defining “damages” as 
“deterioration of the premises and, if applicable, of the contents of the premises,” but excepting 
deterioration “that is the result of the tenant’s use of the premises by normal, nonabusive living”). 
107. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1(1) (1999).  The North Dakota Century Code sets forth 
the obligations of the landlord in maintaining a rental unit: 
1. A landlord of a residential dwelling unit shall: 
a. Comply with the requirements of applicable building and housing codes 
materially affecting health and safety. 
b. Make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in 
a fit and habitable condition. 
c. Keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition. 
d. Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumb-
ing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and ap-
pliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by the landlord. 
e. Provide and maintain appropriate receptacles and conveniences for the re-
moval of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental to the occupancy of 
the dwelling unit and arrange for their removal. 
f. Supply running water and reasonable amounts of hot water at all times and rea-
sonable heat, except if the building that includes the dwelling unit is not required 
by law to be equipped for that purpose or if the dwelling unit is so constructed 
that heat or hot water is generated by an installation within the exclusive control 
of the tenant and supplied by a direct public utility connection or if the water or 
heat is unavailable due to supply failure by a public utility. 
Id. 
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should be stated independently of the types of damages for which de-
ductions are permitted by incorporating the following language into the 
section: 
A lessor may claim of the security deposit only those amounts as 
are reasonably necessary for the purposes specified in subsection 
5(a).  The lessor may not assert a claim against the lessee or the 
security for damages to the premises or any defective conditions 
that preexisted the tenancy, for reasonable wear and tear or the ef-
fects thereof, whether the wear and tear preexisted the tenancy or 
occurred during the tenancy, or for the cumulative effects of rea-
sonable wear and tear occurring during any one or more 
tenancies.108 
Lastly, to assure that both landlord and tenant have a hand in 
memorializing the “original state” of the lease property, the proposed 
amended statute requires the landlord, before lease commencement and the 
tenant’s tender of the security deposit, to present to the tenant a detailed 
checklist of existing damage to the premises.  The tenant would have the 
option of inspecting the property before move-in, but thereafter would be 
required to either sign the checklist agreeing to the condition of the property 
and any known defects at that time or to prepare in writing and sign a state-
ment of dissent: 
3. Prior to tendering any consideration deemed to be a security 
deposit, the prospective lessee shall be presented with a com-
prehensive listing of any then-existing damage to the unit, 
which would be the basis for a charge against the security de-
posit and the estimated dollar cost of repairing such damage.  
When presenting the required listing to the lessee, the lessor 
shall make a good faith effort to explain the contents of the 
listing to the lessee.  The lessee shall have the right to inspect 
the premises to ascertain the accuracy of such listing prior to 
taking occupancy.  The lessor and the lessee shall sign the 
listing, which signatures shall be conclusive evidence of the 
accuracy of such listing, but shall not be construed to be con-
clusive to latent defects.  If the lessee shall refuse to sign such 
listing, he shall state specifically in writing the items on the 
list to which he dissents, and shall sign such statement of 
dissent. 
 
108. Proposed Amended Statute, § 47-16-07.1(5)(b).  This subsection, which would clarify 
the “reasonable wear and tear” exception, is based on the current language of California’s security 
deposit act. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1950.5(e) (Deering 2005 & Supp. 2009). 
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a. A lessor who fails to comply with the requirements of this 
subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth at sub-
section 7(a)-(d). 
b. If, upon presentation and good faith explanation of the check-
list to the lessee, the lessee shall fail to sign the listing or spe-
cifically dissent in accordance with this subsection, the lessee 
shall not be entitled to recover any damages under this 
section.109 
This checklist created at the pre-tenancy review would serve as proof that 
could be used by either party if there is a dispute at lease termination over 
“the original state” when the tenant took possession and whether the tenant 
caused any subsequent damages to the property alleged by the landlord.110  
Failure to participate in the pre-tenancy inspection or listing process would 
result in the landlord’s forfeiture of the right to retain the security deposit or 
bring claims against the tenant at lease end111 and similarly cause the tenant 
to waive the right to recover damages at lease end.112 
B. REQUIRE AN INSPECTION AT LEASE END AND BOLSTER THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE LANDLORD’S ITEMIZED STATEMENT 
As currently written, subsection 47-16-07.1(2) of the North Dakota 
Century Code further obligates landlords to “itemize” the “[a]pplication of 
any portion of a security deposit not paid to the lessee upon termination of 
the lease.”113  The subsection fails, however, to articulate the required 
specificity of the itemization’s content or to mandate particularized support 
for each of the charges being allocated to the tenant through deduction from 
the security deposit.  Leaving the landlord without necessary direction for 
compilation of the itemization and the tenant without sufficient means to 
 
109. Proposed Amended Statute, § 47-16-07.1(3).  In large part, subsection 47-16-07.1(3) of 
the proposed amended statute takes the language from the Kentucky and Georgia security deposit 
provisions mandating this kind of pre-tenancy review. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.580(2)-(3) 
(LexisNexis 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-33(a) (1991); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 186, § 
15B(2)(c) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009) (requiring upon receipt of deposit or by ten days after lease 
commencement, whichever is later, a written statement of present condition of property, including 
a comprehensive damage listing, and allowing a tenant the opportunity to provide a separate 
listing if the tenant believes the landlord’s list is incorrect); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-25-206 
(2007) (requiring, at lease commencement, the preparation and, upon request, furnishing to tenant, 
a statement signed by the landlord “as to the present condition of the premises intended to be let”); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS. SERV. § 554.608 (LexisNexis2007) (requiring completion of an inventory 
checklist by a tenant at lease commencement). 
110. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, § 6:43, at 498. 
111. See Proposed Amended Statute, § 47-16-07.1(3)(a); see also discussion infra notes 123-
25 and accompanying text. 
112. See id. at § 47-16-07.1(3)(b). 
113. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-07.1(2) (1999 & Supp. 2009). 
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validate or challenge specific charges, this sort of vagueness again increases 
the likelihood of landlord abuse and disputes over the administration of the 
security deposit after lease termination.  Moreover, it leaves North Dakota 
courts called upon to settle such disputes without a clear standard by which 
to evaluate the landlord’s itemization and ultimate decision to make with-
holdings from the deposit. 
The proposed amended version of the statute would honor the deterrent 
goals of the Legislature and bring further certainty to both landlord and 
tenant at lease end by requiring the landlord and tenant to conduct a joint 
inspection of the property immediately before lease termination and by add-
ing important details to the itemization requirements currently set forth in 
subsection 47-16-07.1(2).  Following the lead of several states,114 a damage 
inspection involving both landlord and tenant would take place at least five 
days before the tenant’s termination of occupancy.115  After this inspection, 
the landlord would have three additional days to prepare and present to the 
tenant a comprehensive damages listing, which the tenant could then con-
firm or, as necessary, dispute: 
4. At least five days prior to the lessee’s termination of occu-
pancy, the lessor and lessee shall jointly inspect the premises 
to ascertain any existing damage to the premises.  At least two 
days prior to the termination of occupancy, the lessor shall 
present to the lessee a comprehensive list of any damage done 
to the premises which is the basis for any charge against the 
security deposit and the estimated dollar value of such dam-
age.  When presenting the required listing to the lessee, the 
lessor shall make a good faith effort to explain its contents to 
the lessee.  The lessor and the lessee shall sign the list, and 
this shall be conclusive evidence of the accuracy of the list.  If 
 
114. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 33-1321(C) (2007 & Supp. 2008) (requiring a 
landlord, at move-in, to give their tenant “a move-in form for specifying any existing damages to 
the dwelling unit and written notification to the tenant that the tenant may be present at the move-
out inspection”); MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROPERTY § 8-203(f)(1)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 
2008) (authorizing a tenant who gives proper notice of intention to move the right to be present at 
inspection); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-25-201(2) (2007) (requiring, “[a]t the request of either 
party,” the inspection of the lease property within one week prior to lease termination); TENN. 
CODE. ANN. § 66-28-301(b) (Supp. 2008) (outlining requirements for a pre-termination inspection 
by a landlord and tenant and a related process through which a listing of damage to the property 
will be confirmed or challenged by the tenant). 
115. Proposed Amended Statute, § 47-16-07.1(4).  The proposed amended statute would 
generally follow the lease-end inspection requirements presently in place in both Georgia and 
Kentucky. See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-33(b) (1991 & Supp. 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 383.580(3) (LexisNexis 2002); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 33-1321(C) (West 2008); MD. 
CODE ANN. § 8-203(f)(1)(ii); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 70-25-201(2) (Smith 2008); TENN. 
CODE. ANN. § 66-28-301(b). 
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the lessee refuses to sign the list, he shall state specifically in 
writing the items on the list to which he dissents and shall 
sign such statement of dissent.  If the lessee terminates occu-
pancy without notifying the lessor, the lessor may make a fi-
nal inspection within a reasonable time after discovering the 
termination of occupancy. 
a. A lessor who fails to comply with the requirements of this 
subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth at sub-
section 7(a)-(d). 
b. If, upon presentation and good faith explanation of the listing 
to the lessee, the lessee shall fail to sign the listing or specifi-
cally dissent in accordance with this subsection, the lessee 
shall not be entitled to recover any damages under this 
section.116 
Like the pre-tenancy inspection process described above, obligating the 
landlord and tenant to meet and confer in the fashion proposed by this 
amendment before lease end would hopefully create a dialogue and lead to 
the efficient and timely resolution of disagreements between the parties 
rather than litigation.117  The proposed statute would also drive compliance 
by imposing clear penalties on both landlord and tenant for failure to adhere 
to the post-tenancy inspection and listing requirements.118 
With respect to the itemization of damages, which would still be re-
quired within thirty days of lease termination if the landlord retained any 
portion of the security deposit, the proposed amended statute would make 
clear that, first, the landlord must state with specificity each of the charges 
that he seeks to pass along to the tenant, and second, that each such charge 
must be supported by “satisfactory evidence,” such as receipts, invoices, or 
bills.  The specific language added to subsection 47-16-07.1(6) would read 
as follows: 
a. individually list any damages for which the landlord claims 
the tenant is liable; 
b. indicate with particularity the nature of any repair neces-
sary to correct any damage; and 
c. provide satisfactory evidence that the repair necessary to 
correct these damages has been or will be completed. 
 
116. See Proposed Amended Statute, § 47-16-07.1(4). 
117. See Laura K. Weimer, Tenants’ Rights Get New Support: Chapter 1061, 34 MCGEORGE 
L. REV. 495, 503 (2002) (reviewing the contemplated benefits and detriments of a pre-moveout 
walkthrough). 
118. See Proposed Amended Statute, § 47-16-07.1(4)(a)-(b). 
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Satisfactory evidence may include, but not be limited to, 
receipts for purchased repair materials and labor estimates, 
bills, or invoices indicating the actual or estimated cost 
thereof.119 
By enhancing the itemization requirements in this way, the landlord will 
have more confidence as to his obligations for supporting the damages he 
believes in good faith are appropriate for deduction from the security depo-
sit.  At the same time, the tenant will be protected from the arbitrary as-
sessment of charges that the current statute seems to condone. 
C. PROMOTE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF TENANT RIGHTS BY 
MORE CLEARLY CATEGORIZING AND PENALIZING LANDLORD 
NON-COMPLIANCE 
In simply providing that a landlord is “liable for treble damages for any 
security deposit money withheld without reasonable justification,”120 
subsection 47-16-07.1(3) of the North Dakota Century Code presently 
omits the necessary detail setting forth the process and apportioning the 
burden of proof for challenging the withholding of a security deposit.  Fur-
ther, because it does not explicitly allow a tenant to recover attorney’s fees 
and costs in addition to treble damages when a security deposit is withheld 
without reasonable justification, the statute fails to adequately incentivize 
tenants—or the attorneys who would hopefully represent them—to bring 
such challenges.121  Finally, the provisions of this subsection do not suffi-
 
119. Id. at § 47-16-07.1(6).  This subsection of the proposed amended statute, which would 
amend the itemization requirements currently in N.D CENT. CODE § 47-16-07.1(2) (1999 & Supp. 
2009), is modeled after the requirements in place in New Hampshire. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
540-A:7(I) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008) (identifying “receipts for purchased repair materials 
and labor estimates, bills or invoices” as types of “satisfactory evidence” needed to support 
itemized charges); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 15B(4)(iii) (West 2003 & Supp. 
2009) (requiring the landlord, within 30 days of lease end, to provide to tenant “an itemized list of 
damages, sworn to by the lessor or his agent under pains and penalties of perjury, itemizing in 
precise detail the nature of the damage and of the repairs necessary to correct such damage, and 
written evidence, such as estimates, bills, invoices or receipts, indicating the actual or estimated 
cost thereof”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-44(c) (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring notification “together 
with the particulars of and grounds for the retention, including written evidence of the costs of 
remedying tenant defaults, such as estimates or invoices for material and services or of the costs of 
cleaning, such as receipts for supplies and equipment or charges for cleaning services”); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 32-31-3-14 (LexisNexis 2002) (requiring list to set forth “the estimated cost of 
repair for each damaged item” and “the amounts and lease on which the landlord intends to assess 
the tenant”). 
120. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-07.1(3) (1999 & Supp. 2009). 
121. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, § 6:43, at 497 (noting that many states have legislated 
the recovery of court costs and attorney’s fees “[a]s further encouragement for tenants to assert 
their statutory rights”); England, supra note 78, at 1056 (noting that the importance of “allowing 
attorney’s fees is two fold: 1) it insulates the award from being totally depleted by attorney’s fees, 
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ciently address the possibility of landlord non-compliance with the statute’s 
procedural obligations.  For instance, it is presently unclear whether or 
what, if any, penalties will befall a landlord who withholds some or all of a 
tenant’s security deposit, but does not provide the obligatory itemization of 
damages until some point after the requisite thirty-day period has 
expired.122 
Several additions within the proposed amended statute are designed to 
address and bring clarity to each of the above-described issues.123  As a 
means of encouraging landlord compliance with the deposit return and 
itemization requirements, proposed subsection 47-16-07.1(7) would make 
clear that a lessor who fails to return the security deposit or provide the re-
quisite itemization and deposit balance within thirty days, whether in good 
faith or not, forfeits all rights to recovery against the tenant and is liable for 
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs on top of treble damages: 
7. If the lessor fails to provide the lessee with the written, itemized 
notice of deductions from the deposit and the balance shown by 
the notice to be due, or otherwise to comply with subsection 5, 
within thirty days after termination of the lease and delivery of 
possession by the lessee, the lessor: 
a. shall forfeit the right to withhold any portion of the deposit; 
b. shall forfeit the right to assert any counterclaim in any action 
brought to recover that deposit; 
c. shall be liable to the lessee for treble damages, plus court 
costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees; and 
d. shall forfeit the right to assert an independent action against 
the lessee for damages to the rental property.124 
Mandating these penalties for landlord violations would make more likely 
the realization of tenants’ rights that were the goal of the statute’s 
drafters.125 
 
and 2) it encourages the private bar to enforce the security deposit law when small amounts are at 
stake”). 
122. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-07.1(1) (2007). Another example of landlord non-
compliance under the current statute would be the failure to deposit the security deposit monies 
into a federally insured, interest-bearing savings or checking account for the benefit of the lessee. 
See Id. 
123. See Proposed Amended Statute, § 47-16-07.1(7)-(8). 
124. Id. § 47-16-07.1(7). This subsection of the proposed amended statute closely resembles 
the penalty provisions set forth in New Mexico’s security deposit statute.  See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
47-8-18(D) (Supp. 1995).  Regarding other forms of landlord non-compliance with the statute, the 
proposed amended statute also makes clear that a landlord is subject to the penalties set forth at 
proposed subsection (7) if he or she fails to place the deposit in a federally-insured, interest-
bearing account, follow the pre-tenancy inspection and checklist requirements, or follow the lease-
end inspection and checklist requirements. See Proposed Amended Statute, § 47-16-07.1(2)(c), 
(3)(c), 4(c). 
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The proposed amended statute would go further to honor tenant rights 
by enhancing the existing provisions aimed at deterring the wrongful with-
holding of the security deposit.  Specifically, the addition of language to 
subsection 47-16-07.1(8) would permit the recovery of attorney’s fees and 
costs on top of the punitive damages already available to the tenant and set 
forth in more detail the litigation process that will govern withholding dis-
putes.  As amended, the pertinent provision would state that: 
8. A lessor is liable for treble damages, together with reasonable 
attorney’s fees and court costs, for any security deposit money 
withheld without reasonable justification. 
a. A lessee who wishes to initiate a court action under this sec-
tion has the obligation to give notice to the lessor of his in-
tention to file legal proceedings at least seven days prior to 
filing said action. 
b. In any court action brought by a lessee under this section, the 
lessor shall bear the burden of proving that his withholding of 
the security deposit or any portion of it was not justified. 
c. In any action brought under this section, attorney’s fees may 
be awarded to the prevailing party at the discretion of the 
court.126 
Of note, a tenant would be required to give at least seven days notice to the 
landlord before filing a lawsuit seeking recovery of the security deposit,127 
the landlord would bear the burden of proving that the withholding of the 
security deposit, in whole or in part, was not supported by reasonable justi-
fication,128 and the court would have the discretion to award attorney’s fees 
to the prevailing party.129 
 
125. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 13, § 6:43, at 496 (reviewing the “various penalties . . . 
imposed” on landlords “[t]o achieve effective enforcement of tenant rights under the [security de-
posit] statutes”). 
126. See Proposed Amended Statute, § 47-16-07.1(8). 
127. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-103(3)(a) (2008) (obligating the tenant “to give notice to 
the landlord of his intention to file legal proceedings a minimum of seven days prior to filing said 
action”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6034(1) (2003) (also mandating the minimum of seven 
days). 
128. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-103(3)(b) (landlord has burden of proving that the with-
holding was not “wrongful”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6034(3) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 70-25-204(1) (2007) (“burden of proof of damages caused by the tenant to the leasehold pre-
mises is on the landlord”); 68 PA. STAT. ANN. § 250.512(c) (West 2004) (same). 
129. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-25-204(1) (noting that attorney’s fees can be awarded at 
the court’s discretion). 
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D. TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO PROTECT THE TENANT AND GIVE 
DIRECTION TO THE LANDLORD 
The proposed amended version of the North Dakota security deposit 
statute is rounded-out with a few other additions also designed to provide 
more specific instruction to the landlord regarding administration of the de-
posit while maximizing the intended protection to the tenant.  First, to cla-
rify the scope of the statute, the term “security deposit” is defined as “any 
advance, deposit or prepaid rent, however denominated, which is refundable 
to the lessee at the termination or expiration of the lease.  The function of a 
security deposit is to secure the performance of a lessee’s obligations to pay 
rent and to maintain a dwelling unit.”130 
Second, to further elucidate that the deposit is the protected property of 
the tenant, language is added to the already-existing safekeeping provisions 
of subsection 47-16-07.1(2) making explicit: 
The security deposit and any interest accrued shall continue to be 
the property of the lessee, shall not be commingled with the assets 
of the lessor, and shall not be subject to the claims of any creditor 
of the lessor or of the lessor’s successor in interest, including a fo-
reclosing mortgagee or trustee in bankruptcy.131 
Lastly, a concluding provision forbids the waiver or modification of the 
protections guaranteed by the security deposit in a lease or rental 
agreement.132 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In proposing an exhaustive legislative remedy to the problem he de-
scribed as “the old shell game, sometimes known as the ‘disappearing se-
curity deposit,’” Professor John G. Murphy, Jr. noted “[t]he provision suf-
fers from an overkill of detail, but does so on the assumption that only the 
most carefully constructed cage can confine the quarry.”133  With respect to 
the North Dakota security deposit statute, the additional detail that would be 
 
130. Proposed Amended Statute, § 47-16-07.1(1).  This subsection of the proposed amended 
statute is based on the definition of “security deposit” presented in Vermont’s corresponding 
legislation.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4461(a) (2006 & Supp. 2008); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 
44-7-30(3) (Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-102(2); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-
21(10) (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-203(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 
2008); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.102 (Vernon 2007). 
131. See Proposed Amended Statute, § 47-16-07.1(2); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
186, § 15B(1)(e) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009). 
132. See Proposed Amended Statute, § 47-16-07.1(11); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 540-A:8(III) (2006); 68 PA. STAT. ANN. § 250.512(d) (2009). 
133. John G. Murphy, Jr., A Proposal for Reshaping the Urban Rental Agreement, 57 GEO. 
L.J. 464, 475 (1969). 
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added through the amendments suggested in this article is necessary to safe-
guard the legitimate interests of both the tenant and landlord in the resi-
dential leasehold setting.  For tenants, more comprehensive protections, in-
cluding the availability of attorney’s fees and court costs, will make 
enforcement against abusive landlords through litigation more feasible.  
Simultaneously, bolstered itemization requirements and clarification of 
proper withholdings will serve to assure the majority of landlords of the 
proper means of handling the security deposit.  By adopting the proposed 
changes, the North Dakota Legislature would honor the tenant-protective 
intent of the statute and codify a truly “excellent tool for the effective ad-
ministration of justice in security deposit disputes.”134 
 
134. McQuarrie, supra note 5, at 852. 
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PROPOSED AMENDED VERSION 
OF 




LEASING OF REAL PROPERTY 
 
47-16-07.1. Real property and dwelling security deposits–Limitations 
and requirements. 
1. As used in this section, the term “security deposit” means any ad-
vance, deposit or prepaid rent, however denominated, which is re-
fundable to the lessee at the termination or expiration of the lease.  
The function of a security deposit is to secure the performance of a 
lessee’s obligations to pay rent and to maintain a dwelling unit. 
2. The lessor of real property or a dwelling who requires money as a 
security deposit, however denominated, shall deposit the money in 
a federally insured interest-bearing savings or checking account 
for the benefit of the lessee.  The security deposit and any interest 
accruing on the deposit must be paid to the lessee upon 
termination of a lease, subject to the conditions of subsections 5 
and 6.  The security deposit and any interest accrued shall continue 
to be the property of the lessee, shall not be commingled with the 
assets of the lessor, and shall not be subject to the claims of any 
creditor of the lessor or of the lessor’s successor in interest, 
including a foreclosing mortgagee or trustee in bankruptcy. 
a. A lessor may not demand or receive security, however deno-
minated, in an amount or value in excess of one month’s rent, 
except if the lessee is housing a pet on the leased premises, 
the security may not exceed the greater of two thousand five 
hundred dollars or an amount equivalent to two months’ rent. 
b. A lessor is not required to pay interest on security deposits if 
the period of occupancy was less than nine months in 
duration. 
c. A lessor who fails to comply with the requirements of this 
subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth at sub-
section 7(a)-(d). 
3. Prior to tendering any consideration deemed to be a security de-
posit, the prospective lessee shall be presented with a comprehen-
sive listing of any then-existing damage to the unit, which would 
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be the basis for a charge against the security deposit and the esti-
mated dollar cost of repairing such damage.  When presenting the 
required listing to the lessee, the lessor shall make a good faith ef-
fort to explain the contents of the listing to the lessee. The lessee 
shall have the right to inspect the premises to ascertain the accu-
racy of such listing prior to taking occupancy. The lessor and the 
lessee shall sign the listing, which signatures shall be conclusive 
evidence of the accuracy of such listing, but shall not be construed 
to be conclusive to latent defects. If the lessee shall refuse to sign 
such listing, he shall state specifically in writing the items on the 
list to which he dissents, and shall sign such statement of dissent. 
a. A lessor who fails to comply with the requirements of this 
subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth at sub-
section 7(a)-(d). 
b. If, upon presentation and good faith explanation of the check-
list to the lessee, the lessee shall fail to sign the listing or spe-
cifically dissent in accordance with this subsection, the lessee 
shall not be entitled to recover any damages under this 
section. 
4. At least five days prior to the lessee’s termination of occupancy, 
the lessor and lessee shall jointly inspect the premises to ascertain 
any existing damage to the premises.  At least two days prior to 
the termination of occupancy, the lessor shall present to the lessee 
a comprehensive list of any damage done to the premises which is 
the basis for any charge against the security deposit and the esti-
mated dollar value of such damage. When presenting the required 
listing to the lessee, the lessor shall make a good faith effort to ex-
plain its contents to the lessee. The lessor and the lessee shall sign 
the list, and this shall be conclusive evidence of the accuracy of 
the list.  If the lessee refuses to sign the list, he shall state specifi-
cally in writing the items on the list to which he dissents and shall 
sign such statement of dissent. If the lessee terminates occupancy 
without notifying the lessor, the lessor may make a final inspection 
within a reasonable time after discovering the termination of 
occupancy. 
a. A lessor who fails to comply with the requirements of this 
subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth at sub-
section 7(a)-(d). 
b. If, upon presentation and good faith explanation of the listing 
to the lessee, the lessee shall fail to sign the listing or specifi-
cally dissent in accordance with this subsection, the lessee 
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shall not be entitled to recover any damages under this 
section. 
5. a. A lessor may apply security deposit money and accrued in-
terest upon termination of a lease towards: 
(1) Any damages the lessor has suffered by reason of deteri-
orations or injuries to the real property or dwelling 
through the negligence of the lessee or the lessee’s guest. 
(2) Any unpaid rent. 
(3) The costs of cleaning or other repairs which were the re-
sponsibility of the lessee, and which are necessary to re-
turn the dwelling unit to its original state when the lessee 
took possession, reasonable wear and tear excepted. 
b. A lessor may claim of the security deposit only those 
amounts as are reasonably necessary for the purposes speci-
fied in subsection 5(a).  The lessor may not assert a claim 
against the lessee or the security for damages to the premises 
or any defective conditions that preexisted the tenancy, for 
reasonable wear and tear or the effects thereof, whether the 
wear and tear preexisted the tenancy or occurred during the 
tenancy, or for the cumulative effects of reasonable wear and 
tear occurring during any one or more tenancies. 
c. As used in this section, “reasonable wear and tear” includes 
any deterioration to the real property or dwelling  
(1) based upon the use for which the rental unit is intended, 
without negligence, carelessness, accident, or abuse of 
the premises or equipment or chattels by the lessee or 
members of his household, or their invitees or guests; or 
(2) caused by the lessor’s failure to prepare for expected 
conditions or by the lessor’s failure to comply with an 
obligation of the lessor imposed by this chapter.” 
6. Application of any portion of a security deposit not paid to the les-
see upon termination of the lease must be itemized by the lessor.  
Such itemization together with the amount due must be delivered 
or mailed to the lessee at the last address furnished lessor, along 
with a written notice within thirty days after termination of the 
lease and delivery of possession by the lessee. The notice must 
contain a statement of any amount still due the lessor or the refund 
due the lessee.  The itemization must: 
a. individually list any damages for which the landlord claims 
the tenant is liable; 
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b. indicate with particularity the nature of any repair necessary 
to correct any damage; and 
c. provide satisfactory evidence that the repair necessary to 
correct these damages has been or will be completed.  
Satisfactory evidence may include, but is not be limited to, 
receipts for purchased repair materials and labor estimates, 
bills, or invoices indicating the actual or estimated cost 
thereof. 
7. If the lessor fails to provide the lessee with the written, itemized 
notice of deductions from the deposit and the balance shown by 
the notice to be due, or otherwise to comply with subsection 5, 
within thirty days after termination of the lease and delivery of 
possession by the lessee, the lessor: 
a. shall forfeit the right to withhold any portion of the deposit; 
b. shall forfeit the right to assert any counterclaim in any action 
brought to recover that deposit; 
c. shall be liable to the lessee for treble damages, plus court 
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; and 
d. shall forfeit the right to assert an independent action against 
the lessee for damages to the rental property. 
8. A lessor is liable for treble damages, together with reasonable 
attorney’s fees and court costs, for any security deposit money 
withheld without reasonable justification. 
a. A lessee who wishes to initiate a court action under this sec-
tion has the obligation to give notice to the lessor of his in-
tention to file legal proceedings at least seven days prior to 
filing said action. 
b. In any court action brought by a lessee under this section, the 
lessor bears the burden of proving that withholding the secu-
rity deposit or any portion of it was not justified. 
c. In any action brought under this section, attorney’s fees may 
be awarded to the prevailing party at the discretion of the 
court. 
9. Upon a transfer in ownership of the leased real property or 
dwelling, the security deposit and accrued interest shall be 
transferred to the grantee of the lessor’s interest.  The grantor shall 
not be relieved of liability under this section until transfer of the 
security deposit to the grantee.  The holder of the lessor’s interest 
in the real property or dwelling at the termination of a lease shall 
be bound by this section even though such holder was not the 
original lessor who received the security deposit. 
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10. This section applies to the state and to political subdivisions of the 
state that lease real property or dwellings and require money as a 
security deposit. 
11. Any provision in a lease or rental agreement by which the tenant is 
purported to waive any of his rights under this section is void. 
 
